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GENERALLY

Background of Section 16(b)

Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (the Exchange
Act) is part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme 2 which was enacted by
3
Congress to remedy widespread abuses on the national securities exchanges.
The statute was enacted in the aftermath of the stock market collapse of
1929 to protect the market from insider trading which undermined investor
confidence. 4 The factual background of abuse that led to the enactment of
the Exchange Act is summarized in section 2 of the Act.5 The Exchange Act
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976) provides as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by him for any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and
in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty
days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such
suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the
security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules
and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection. [Hereinafter cited as section 16(b)].
2. The federal securities acts comprising the scheme are: Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat.
74 (codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976)); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976)) [hereinafter cited
as Exchange Act]; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838 (codified in
amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79z (1976)); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149
(codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976)); Investment Company Act of
1940, 54 Stat. 789 (codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1976)); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 2, 54 Stat. 847 (codified in amended form at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I
to -21 (1976)).
3. Those abuses included excessive use of credit in securities transactions, pool operations,
manipulations such as matched orders, and other devices designed to create a misleading appearance of activity. See generaly, Stock Exchange Regulation. Hean'ngson HR. 7852 and HR. 8720
Before the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Stock Exchange
Practices Hearings on S Res 84, S Res. 56 and S Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Curreng, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
4. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
5. For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as commonly
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a
national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control
of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, including transactions by officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate reports, and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and control
reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of
fair and honest markets in such transactions:
(1) Such transactions (a) are carried on in large volume by the public generally
and in large part originate outside the States in which the exchanges and over-thecounter markets are located and/or are affected by means of the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce; (b) constitute an important part of the current of inter1.
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imposes regulatory controls upon the national securities exchanges, upon the
practices employed in trading in securities listed and registered on such exchanges, and upon brokers and dealers. These controls are designed to protect the investing public by the establishment and maintenance of free and
open markets for the buying and selling of securities, and by preventing and
prohibiting abuse of facilities provided by the exchanges.
The Exchange Act seeks to accomplish these designs by mandating that
listed corporations file and publish detailed information about their organization, operations, management, and financial prospects; 6 by limiting the
use of credit in security transactions; 7 by outlawing pooling operations, manipulations, and similar deceptive devices in the securities market;8 by requiring complete disclosure in connection with proxy solicitations; 9 by
requiring officers, directors, and owners of more than ten percent of any class
of any equity security (other than an exempted security) of an issuer, which
is registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act, to file reports of the
amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial
owner and any changes in such ownership;' 0 by depriving such officers, directors, and ten percent shareholders of any incentive to abuse their position
by trading in the securities of their corporations on the basis of information
12
not known to the public;"I and by completely prohibiting certain sales.
Section 16 is a vital cog in this statutory scheme. Directors, officers, and
state commerce; (c) involve in large part the securities of issuers engaged in interstate
commerce; (d) involve the use of credit, directly affect the financing of trade, industry,
and transportation in interstate commerce, and directly affect and influence the volume of interstate commerce; and affect the national credit.
(2) The prices established and offered in such transactions are generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign countries and constitute a
basis for determining and establishing the prices at which securities are bought and
sold, the amount of certain taxes owing to the United States and to the several States
by owners, buyers, and sellers of securities, and the value of collateral for bank loans.
(3) Frequently the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets are susceptible to manipulation and control, and the dissemination of such prices gives rise to
excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the prices
of securities which (a) cause alternately unreasonable expansion and unreasonable
contraction of the volume of credit available for trade, transportation, and industry in
interstate commerce, (b) hinder the proper appraisal of the value of securities and thus
prevent a fair calculation of taxes owing to the United States and to the several States
by owners, buyers, and sellers of securities, and (c) prevent the fair valuation of collateral for bank loans and/or obstruct the effective operation of the national banking
system and Federal Reserve System.
(4) National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the
dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices
and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets, and to meet such emergencies the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to burden the national
credit.
15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976) See also H.R. REP. Nos. 1383, 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP.
Nos. 792, 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78/, 78m (1976).
7
7. Id
8g, 78h.
8. Id § 78i, 78j.
9. Id § 78n.
10. Id. § 78p(a).
I1. Id § 78p(b).
12. Id § 78p(c).
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ten percent shareholders of corporations, by virtue of their inside position,
have access to information not available to the general investing public. By
reason of their control, these insiders have the ability to pervert corporate
actions for the sole purpose of influencing stock prices. If an insider takes
advantage of special knowledge and trades in the stock of the corporation,
the result is a market in the security that does not represent a true appraisal
of its value.
The investigation that preceded the adoption of the Exchange Act uncovered numerous instances in which insiders had taken advantage of their
special knowledge.1 3 For example, during 1939, over 100 stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange were subjected to pooling operations. 14 This use
of inside information to reap large profits from stock market activity at the
expense of non-insiders resulted in a countrywide call for reform. Congress
answered that call with section 16, to "bring these practices into disrepute
15
and encourage the voluntary maintenance of proper fiduciary standards."'
Section 16(b) allows the issuer of securities registered under section 12 of
the Exchange Act, 16 or a shareholder suing on behalf of such an issuer, to
recover any profit realized by insiders on securities transactions involving a
purchase and sale or sale and purchase within any period of less than six
The 1934 report of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee stated:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of
corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential information which
came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to
this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of insider information by large
stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the
destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and profit by information not
available to others.

13.

SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455,

73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). The Commission later noted:
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act, profits from "sure thing"
speculation in the stocks of their corporations were more or less generally accepted by
the financial community as part of the emolument for serving as a corporate officer or
director notwithstanding the flagrantly inequitable character of such trading.
10 SEC ANN. REP. 50 (1944).
14. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33, 47 (1934). One pool in a seven-day period
bought and sold almost 1,500,000 shares of R.C.A. stock, at a net profit to the members of the
pool of almost $5,000,000. In another case, the chairman of an executive committee participated with a director in a pool organized to trade in the stock of their company. When the pool
was formed, the company was paying no dividends. Shortly thereafter, the chairman and director caused the company to declare a dividend. A policy of irregular dividends was continued,
payable at such strategic times that more than twenty-five percent of dividends paid was received by the pool. These dividends were paid despite the fact that the company's earnings
were insufficient to cover them and corporate surplus was diverted for that purpose. S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). In another case, the president of a corporation and his
brothers controlled the corporation with approximately ten percent of its shares. Shortly before
the corporation passed a dividend, they disposed of their holdings for over $16,000,000 and later
repurchased them for approximately $7,000,000. Id.
15. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
16. § 12(g) requires the registration by an issuer having total assets exceeding $1,000,000 of
each class of equity security held of record by 500 or more persons if such issuer is engaged in
interstate commerce or in a business affecting such commerce or if its securities are traded by
use of the mails or interstate commerce. In addition, any issuer having a class of equity securities listed on a national securities exchange must register the securities under § 12. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781(a), (g)(l) (1976). A national securities exchange is a stock exchange registered under § 6
of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
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months.' 7 An insider for the purposes of section 16(b) is a person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any
class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such a security.'
Section 16(b) was described by the administration's spokesman in the
1934 congressional hearings as a "crude rule of thumb."' 9 Under the "crude
rule of thumb," it is irrelevant that the insider either did not make unfair use
of inside information or did not intend at the time he purchased the security
to sell it within six months. Section 16(b) applies irrespective of the good
faith or intent of the insider. 20 Further, the insider may be liable under
section 16(b) even if stock is acquired pursuant to an incentive stock option
plan initiated by the issuer, 2 1 or if stock is sold at the suggestion of the issuer.2 2 On the other hand, an insider who separates his "purchases" and
"sales" by more than six months does not become liable under section 16(b)
23
even if unfair use of insider information is proved.
If an insider purchases and sells securities of the issuer within a six
month period, the statute mandates that the issuer recover any profit realized. As Judge Clark said, speaking for the Second Circuit in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,24 the first section 16(b) decision of that court, "the only remedy
which its framers deemed effective for this reform was the imposition of a
25
liability based upon an objective measure of proof."
Although section 16(b) was intended to ease the plaintiffs evidentiary
burdens and to be rigidly and mechanically enforced, the apparent simplicity of the statutory scheme has yielded to significant interpretative
problems.2 6 This article will explore many of those problems as they relate
to insider trading in connection with issuer-granted employee stock options.
17. For the method used in computing profits recoverable under § 16(b), see note 160 infra
and accompanying text.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976). See also notes 108-25 iqfa and accompanying text.
19. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before a Subcomm. ofthe Sen. Comm. on Bankig and Currencg, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) (testimony of Thomas Corcoran). See also
Booth v. Varian Assoc., 334 F.2d I, 5 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
20. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1041 (2d ed. 1961).
21. MacDonald v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 534, 540 (7th Cir. 1956); Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Jefferson Lake Sulpher Co. v. Walet, 104
F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (E.D. La. 1952), aj'd, 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
22. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972
(1956). The Second Circuit held that the rights of the issuer and its innocent shareholders
cannot be defeated by proving that the real party in interest was the plaintiff's attorney, whose
sole motive was to obtain a fee.
23. See Alder v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959), where Judge Burger noted:
Congress recognized . . . that § 16(b) would not correct all the practices thought
to be evil; obviously the six month limitation alone "let many fish out of the net" since
the tax laws tend to encourage a holding period longer than six months. . . .One can
speculate on whether the moral or ethical values are altered by the passage of 24 hours
but the statute makes an honest if not honorable man out of the insider in that period.
Id at 845.
24. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (944).
25. 136 F.2d at 235. This quotation was repeated in Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). See also Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156,
165 (3d Cir. 1965).
26. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593-95
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Reporting of Holdings and TransactionsPursuant to Section 16(a)

Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act 2 7 provides that the statutory insider
is required to file, with the Securities Exchange Commission (the Commission) and the exchange on which the issuer's stock is listed, initial reports of
his holdings of the issuer's equity securities 28 within ten days of becoming an
insider. One who is already an insider when the corporation registers must
file by the effective date of the registration statement. Additionally, he must
file reports within ten days after the close of any calendar month in which
there has been a change in his holdings. A report must be filed for each
month in which there has been any change in the amount of securities bene29
ficially owned, even though there are no holdings at the end of the month,
or the balance between purchases and sales has resulted in no net change in
holdings over the month,3 or the only change is in the nature of beneficial
3
ownership. 1
Statutory insiders must report all holdings of equity securities of the
issuer, including holdings of unregistered classes of the issuer. Reporting is
required of each officer and director of an issuer which has any class of its
equity securities registered on a national securities exchange, irrespective of
whether he owns any of the listed securities. 32 Reporting is not required of
officers or directors if only debt securities are registered. 33 A beneficial owner who is neither an officer nor director is required to report only if he owns
more than ten percent of a registered equity security; if he does not, he need
not report regardless of the amount of his holdings in unregistered equity
(1973); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.), ceri. dented, 400 U.S. 854
(1970). Se a/so notes 126-55 infra and accompanying text.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976) provides as follows:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to Section 78/ of this title, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such
security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration
statement filed pursuant to Section 78 1(g) of this title, or within ten days after he
becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission
(and, if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the
exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if
there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the
Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall
also file with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the
calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.

Id

28. Id
29. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 21 (1934).
30. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 101 (1935); Form 4, Instr. 6(b).
31. Form 4, Instr. 6(b). The initial filing is made on Form 3 and the subsequent reports on
Form 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (1978); Form 3, Instr. l(a); Form 4, Instr. l(a).
32. The original Feltcher-Rayburn Bill required directors and officers to report only if they
owned five percent of a class of registered securities. S Hearings on S Res. 56, 84 and 97, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6555 (1934). This was altered in the final bill.
33. Note, however, that a convertible bond is an "equity security" under § 3(a)(l 1) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1 1) (1976). Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831,834
(D.N.J. 1963), modiftdon othergrounds, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). See also notes 78-89 infra and
accompanying text.
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securities of the issuer. If he does own ten percent of a registered class of the
of
issuer's securities, he must then report all holdings, of whatever amount,
34
all other equity securities of the issuer, whether registered or not.
The reports are public documents and are available at both the Com35
Additionally, the
mission and the exchange on which the stock is listed.
in these recontained
information
the
publishes
and
compiles
Commission
ports in an "Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings of
Directors, Officers, and Principal Stockholders," copies of which are available at the Commission and each exchange, and which are widely distributed to interested persons.

C. Jursdicttonand Venue
The language of section 16(b) permits suits to be instituted "in any
court of competent jurisdiction," 36 but "exclusive jurisdiction of violations of
this title. . . and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this title" is reserved to the federal courts in
section 27 of the Exchange Act. 3 7 Under section 27, venue may be laid in
any district in which the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, transacts busi38
ness, or where any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred.
Venue has been found to be proper in the district in which the exchange is
39
located if the order was executed on the exchange, regardless of where the
order to buy or sell was given or where the profits were realized or were to be
payable, and in the district in which any part of the acts, conduct, or trans4°
actions constituting the purchase or sale took place.

D.

Statute of Limitations

The language of section 16(b) specifically provides that no suit may be
41
brought "more than two years after the date such profit was realized."
Other civil liability provisions of the Exchange Act provide that an action
42
The twomay be brought for one year after the cause of action occurred.
43
completed.
is
transaction
year period begins to run when the prohibited
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(b) (1978).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-3(a) (1978). Where the security is traded on more than one exchange, the issuer may designate one exchange for filing reports. Id § 240.16a-1(c).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
37. Id § 78aa (1976). In American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N.Y. 36, 64 N.E.2d 347
(1945), in a § 16(b) action brought in a state court, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the only courts of competent jurisdiction were those in the federal system.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
39. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Berkwich v. Mencher, 239 F. Supp. 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Grossman v. Young, 70 F. Supp. 970
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
40. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Falco v.
Donner Foundation, Inc., 208 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953); Rothenberg v. Silberman, 278 F. Supp.
116 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Peyser v. Meehan Fund, Inc. 264 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Blau v.
Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), ajdtipart,rev'din part, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 20 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
42. Id §§ 78i(e), 78r(c), 78cc(b).

43. Sonics Int'l, Inc. v. Johnson, 387 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
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However, failure to adhere to the reporting requirements of section 16(a)
may extend the period during which an action may be brought.44
E.

GeneralExemptions
1.

Exemptions Applicable to the Exchange Act Generally

Section 16(b) parenthetically exempts from coverage an "exempted security."4' ' 5 An exempted security is defined in section 3(a)(12) as a direct
obligation of, or obligation guaranteed by, either a federal or state government; securities issued or guaranteed by corporations in which the United
States has an interest and which are designated for exemption by the Secretary of the Treasury; and any other securities exempted by the Commission
"by such rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, either unconditionally or
upon specified terms and conditions or for stated periods." '4 6 The power of
the Commission to adopt rules under section 3(a)(12) has been broadly con47
strued and the Commission has made numerous exemptions thereunder.
Additionally, the Commission has exempted certain fiduciary transactions, 48
treasury shares,49 and small transactions 5° from section 16(b) coverage.
2.

Exemptions Applicable to Section 16(b) Specifically

The language of section 16(b) exempts all acquisitions "in good faith in
connection with a debt previously contracted" 5 ' and permits the Commission to exempt any transaction not comprehended within the purpose of section 16(b). 52 Further, arbitrage transactions within the meaning of section
16(e) 53 and transactions by a broker-dealer as a market maker and not for
investment purposes5 4 are exempt from the operation of section 16(b).
The Commission has adopted several exemptive rules under its section
16(b) authority, which are not relevant to our analysis of insider trading
44. In Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), Judge Rifkind noted that the
short statute of limitations "is intelligible when read in the context of an absolute duty to make
prompt and frequent reports of the activities which may give rise to such an action," but that
the purpose of Congress would be frustrated if an insider were "to escape repayment of his
profits by compounding his fault in failing to file the required reports," and determined that
here as in " 'every federal statute of limitations, . . . the bar of the statute does not begin to run
until the fraud is discovered.' " Id at 378 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397
(1946)). Late reporting will not, however, result in § 16(b) liability if the purchase and sale are
more than six months apart. Rogers v. Valentine, 37 F.R.D. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(a), (b) (1976).
46. Id § 78c(a)(12). For example, certain foreign securities, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1978),
and odd-lot transactions, Id § 240.16a-5, are exempted.
47. For a more complete discussion of this section, see 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
797 (2d ed. 1961).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-4(a) (1978).
49. Id § 240.16a-4(b).
50. Id § 240.16a-9.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). See aLo Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.
1961); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
53. Id § 78p(e). See Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc., 208 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), (d) (1976); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973).
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involving stock options. 55 The Commission has also exercised its exemptive
authority under section 16(b) in two instances crucial to the application of
the section to insider trading involving issuer-granted employee stock options.
a.

Rule 16b-3

In rule 16b-3, 56 the Commission exempts from the coverage of section
16(b) any acquisition by statutory insiders of shares of stock (other than
stock acquired upon the exercise of an option, warrant, or right) pursuant to
a stock bonus, profit sharing, retirement, incentive, thrift, savings, or similar
plan, or any acqusti'on of a qualiiedor a restrictedstock option pursuant to a qualified
or restrictedstock option plan, or of a stock option pursuant to an employee stock purchase
plan, by a director or officer of the issuer of such stock or stock option if the plan
complies with all requirements of the rule. 57 Nothing in this rule relates to
option transactions by ten percent shareholders because the situation contemplated here is the employee stock option or stock purchase plan.
Paragraph (d) of the rule 58 incorporates portions of the Internal Revenue Code definitions of qualified stock option plan, employee stock purchase
plan, and restricted stock option plan, 59 but the rule deems an option to be a
55. Rule 16(b)-I exempts certain transactions by registered investment companies that
have been exempted from section 17(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16b-1 (1978). Rule 16b-2 exempts underwriting transactions in which a person not an
insider participates in the underwriting on terms at least as favorable as those of the insider
underwriter and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate participation of all persons exempted by the rule. Id § 240.16b-2. Rule 16b-4 exempts certain transactions by registered
public utility holding companies which have been approved under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935. Id § 240.16b-4. Rule 16b-5 exempts certain transactions where securities are received by redeeming other securities by corporations who manage and care for the
stock of another corporation. d § 240.16b-5. Rule 16b-7 exempts certain acquisitions and
dispositions of securities in connection with mergers or consolidations that do not result in any
significant change in the character or structure of the company. Id § 240.16b-7. Rule 16b-8
exempts transactions involving the deposit or withdrawal of equity securities under a voting
trust or deposit agreement. Id § 240.16b-8. Rule 16b-9 exempts certain transactions involving
the conversion of equity securities. Id. § 240.16b-9.
d. § 240.16b-3.
56.
57. Id.
58. Id § 240.16b-3(d).
59. The three types of plans have many similar features, in part because they must meet
many of the same requirements to qualify for favorable tax treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 421-425.
Relevant features for § 16(b) purposes follow.
Under the plans an employee is granted an option to purchase a specified number of the
corporation's shares. The minimum purchase price is determined under specific rules that differ
for each type of plan. The exercise price of qualified stock options must be not less than 100% of
the fair market value of the shares subject to option at the date of grant, while the exercise price
of employee stock purchase plan options must be not less than the lower of 85% of the fair
market value of the shares at the date of grant or 85% of the fair market value at the date of
exercise. However, restricted stock options are of little importance today because they qualify
for favorable tax treatment only if granted on or before December 31, 1963, unless such options
are granted thereafter pursuant to a binding written contract entered into, or a written plan
adopted and approved by the shareholders, before January 1, 1964, which must meet other
stringent requirements. Id. § 424(c)(3).
Under the prior law restricted stock option plans did not require shareholder approval to
qualify for favorable tax treatment, although such approval was frequently sought for corporate
reasons. In contrast, certain aspects of qualified stock option plans and employee stock purchase
plans (e.g., the number of shares available for the plan) must be shareholder-approved. Id
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restricted stock option even if granted after the Internal Revenue Code's
cutoff date for favorable tax treatment, December 31, 1963.60 To qualify for
the rule 16b-3 exemption, however, the plan must meet both these definitional requirements and the other conditions of the rule.6 ' Although the
requirements of rule 16b-3 appear to make compliance simple, many employers still do not have conforming plans.
Ordinarily, the acquisition by an insider of a stock option granted pursuant to a qualified or restricted stock option plan or employee stock
purchase plan will not be matched with a subsequent sale of that option
itself, because such options must be nontransferable except by will or the
laws of descent to qualify for favorable tax treatment. 6 2 On the other hand,
the sale by an insider within six months of acquisition of transferable options
acquired pursuant to a nonqualified stock option plan, or of other transferable options, may give rise to liability under section 16(b). 63 Further, rule
16b-3 does not exempt the acquisition by an insider of shares of stock upon
the exercise of qualified or restricted stock options or employee stock
purchase plan options from the operation of section 16(b), but rather ex64
empts only the options themselves.
For qualification of a plan under rule 16b-3, compliance must be made
with four basic requirements: approval by shareholders, dissemination of
information to shareholders and the Commission, discretion in the selection
of recipients made only by "disinterested" persons as defined by the rule,
65
and limitation on dollar and share amounts.
Paragraph (a) of rule 16b-3 66 provides that an option acquired by an
§§ 422(b)(1), 423(b)(2). Stock option and stock purchase plans may also differ in the type of
eligible recipients of the options and in the manner and periods of the exercise of the options
and payment for the underlying shares. The recipients of qualified or restricted stock options
may be limited for tax purposes to officers and other key employees of the corporation. In
contrast, employee stock purchase plan options must be made available to all employees of the
corporation, except that the corporation, in its discretion, may exclude certain specified classes
of employees, including those who do not work full time or throughout the year and "officers,
persons whose principal duties consist of supervising the work of other employees, or highly
compensated employees." Id § 423(b)(4)(D). Moreover, under the terms of a tax-qualified employee stock purchase plan, all employees granted options to purchase shares must have the
"same rights and privileges," except that the number of shares allocated under such options
may bear a uniform relationship to an employee's total compensation. Id. § 423(b)(5).
Restricted stock options may be exercisable for a maximum of ten years from the date of
grant. Id § 424(b)(4). Qualified stock options may be exercisable for a maximum of five years
from the date of grant. Id § 422(b)(3). Employee stock purchase plan options may be exercisable for a maximum of 27 months from the date of grant unless the option price is to be not less
than 85% of the fair market value of the shares at the date of exercise, in which case such
options may be exercisable for five years. Id. § 423(b)(7). Under any of the plans, the corporation may grant the employees the discretion to elect when to exercise their options until the date
of expiration.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d)(2) (1978).
61. Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62. I.R.C. §§ 421-425. However, acquisition of a nontransferable option may be matched
with a sale within six months of a transferable option of the same issuer.
63. See notes 166-68 ingfa and accompanying text.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1978). Keller Industries, Inc. v. Walden, 462 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1972).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1978).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(a) (1978).
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insider pursuant to a qualified plan is exempted from the operation of section 16(b) by rule 16b-3 only if the plan "has been approved, directly or
indirectly" by a majority of the shareholders of the corporation. 6 7 Such approval may be accomplished either by the affirmative votes of the holders of
a majority of the securities of the issuer present or represented and entitled to
vote at a shareholders' meeting, or by the written consent of the holders of a
majority of the securities of the issuer entitled to vote.
Paragraph (a) of rule 16b-3 further provides that if the vote or written
consent for the approval of the plan was not solicited substantially in accordance with the proxy rules in effect under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act 68
at the time of such vote or written consent and proxies regarding approval or
disapproval of the plan were being solicited, the issuer must furnish in writing to the holders of record of the securities entitled to vote for the plan
substantially the same information concerning the plan which would be required by the rules and regulations in effect under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act on or prior to the date of the first annual meeting of the security
holders held subsequent to the later of the first registration of an equity security under section 12 of the Exchange Act or the acquisition of an equity
security for which exemption is claimed. Additionally, four copies of such
written information must be filed with the Commission not later than the
69
date on which it was first sent or given to the security holders of the issuer.
Paragraph (b) of rule 16b-3 70 provides that if the selection of those directors or officers of the issuer to whom stock may be allocated or to whom
stock options or stock appreciation rights may be granted under the plan, or
if the determination of the number or maximum number of shares of stock
which may be allocated to any director or officer or which may be covered
by stock options or stock appreciation rights granted to any director or officer, is subject to the discretion of any person, such discretion must be exercised under carefully circumscribed conditions. In the case of either officers
or directors, selection for participation in the plan must be made by "disinterested persons." Under rule 16b-3, a "disinterested person" is a plan administrator "who is not at the time he exercises discretion in administering
the plan eligible for selection as a person to whom stock may be allocated or
to whom stock options or stock appreciation rights may be granted pursuant
to the plan or any other plan of the issuer or any of its affiliates entitling the
participants therein to acquire stock, stock options or stock appreciation
71
rights of the issuer or any of its affiliates."
In the case of participation by directors, discretion may be exercised
only by the board of directors of the issuer, if a majority of the board and a
majority of the directors acting in the matter are disinterested persons, by or
only in accordance with the recommendation of a committee of three or
more disinterested persons having full authority to act in the matter, or in
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(a) (1978).
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(b) (1978).
Id § 240.16b-3(d)(3).
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accordance with the provisions of the plan. If discretion is to be exercised in
accordance with the plan, it must specify the number or maximum number
of shares of stock which directors may acquire or which may be subject to
stock options or stock appreciation rights granted to directors, including the
terms upon which and the periods within which such stock may be acquired
or such options may be acquired and exercised, or the plan must provide by
formula or otherwise some effective and determinable limitations with respect to the number of shares which may be acquired by or be subject to
options of directors based upon such factors as: earnings of the issuer, dividends paid, compensation received by participants, options prices, market
value of shares, outstanding shares of percentages of outstanding shares from
72
time to time, or similar factors.
With respect to the participation of officers who are not directors, discretion may be exercised by the board of directors of the issuer or a com
mittee of three or more directors, or only in accordance with the recommendation of a committee of three or more disinterested persons having full au73
thority to act on the matter.
Paragraph (c) of rule 16b-3 74 provides that the plan must effectively
limit the aggregate dollar amount or the aggregate number of shares which
may be allocated or which may be subject to stock options or stock appreciation rights issued pursuant to the plan. The limitations, established either on
an annual basis or for the duration of the plan (whether or not the plan has a
fixed termination date), may be determined either by fixed or maximum
dollar amounts or fixed or maximum numbers of shares or percentages outstanding from time to time or similar factors which would result in an effective and determinable limitation. To prevent dilution or enlargement of
rights, it is permissible to provide for the adjustment of the plan or of stock
allocable or options outstanding, notwithstanding the existence of any limi75
tation.

b. Rule 16b-6
Despite the fact that the Commission was warned by dictum in Ralner v.
Lehman 76 that "the Commission may exempt 'transactions' but it cannot reduce the liability imposed by Section 16(b)," 77 it has adopted rule 16b-6, 78
exempting the portion of profits realized from the sale of securities acquired
pursuant to an option that is attributable to a long-term increment in the
value of the option. The rule exempts from section 16(b) liability profits
realized on transactions involving a purchase pursuant to the exercise of an
option acquired either more than six months before its exercise or pursuant
to an employment contract entered into more than six months prior to its
exercise, to the extent that the profits exceed the difference between the pro72. Id § 240.16b-3(b)(1).
73. Id § 240.16b-3(b)(2).
74. Id § 240.16b-3(c).
75.

Id

76. 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
77. Id. at 566.
78. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1978).
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ceeds of the sale and the lowest market price of the security within six
months before or after the sale. 79 The rule was made retroactive, and the
only case testing the applicability of the rule to transactions occurring prior
to its promulgation supported its retroactive application. 0
F.

Deflintions
1.

Equity Securities

For a violation of section 16(b) to occur, shortswing profits must be
made by a statutory insider in a purchase and sale or sale and purchase of
"any equity security of such issuer." 8' "Equity security" is defined in section
3(a)(1 1) of the Exchange Act 8 2 to mean:
any stock or similar security; or any security convertible, with or
without consideration, into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any
such warrant or right; or any other security which the Commission
shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to treat as an equity
8 3
security.
The Commission expanded this definition in 1965 by enacting rule 3al 1-:84
The term "equity security" is hereby defined to include any stock
or similar security, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit sharing agreement, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, voting trust certificate or certificate of deposit for an equity security, limited partnership interest, interest in
a joint venture, or certificate of interest in a business trust; or any
security convertible, with or without consideration into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase
85
such a security; or any such warrant or right ....
Even before the enactment of this rule, voting trust certificates and certificates of deposit were considered to be equity securities wherever the underly86
ing securities were equity securities.
Treasury stock has been held to be an "equity security" even though it
is expressly included in the statutory definition of "security," 8 7 and not spe79. Brenner v. Career Academy, Inc., 467 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1972); see also note 160 znfa
and accompanying text.
80. Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).

82. Id § 78c(a)(11).
83. Id.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1978).
85. Id § 240.16a-2.
86. Id.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976) provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or
other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as
a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
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cifically mentioned in the statutory definition of "equity security." 8 8
That stock options, at least calls, spreads, and straddles,8 9 may be equity securities is clear under the language of section 3(a)(11),90 the language
of rule 3al1-1, 9 1 and by case law that has determined that the ability to
convert into or to acquire equity securities satisfies the definitional requirement. 92 It seems, however, that nonassignable calls issued by stockholders
are not equity securities under the statute.9 3 The legislative history of section 16(b) indicates that Congress recognized that options are susceptible to
abuse by insiders and are at the root of the evils of insider shortswing activity. 94 Thus, it appears that options to purchase stock granted by the issuer
are "equity securities" under the statute and shortswing profits by statutory
insiders in transactions involving such options may be subject to section
16(b) recovery by the issuer.
2.

Class

A statutory insider for purposes of section 16 includes the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other
than an exempt security) which is registered pursuant to the Exchange
Act. 95 Problems may arise in deciding whether a person is beneficial owner
of more than ten percent of a "class" of equity security. Rule 16a-2 96 provides that a class of a given security is deemed to consist of the entire amount
outstanding, "exclusive of any securities of such class held by or for the account of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer."' 97 However, the class of
securities when voting trust certificates or certificates of deposit for equity
securities are involved consists of the entire amount issuable for the class of
equity securities which may be deposited, regardless of how many have been
banker's acceptance, which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which
is likewise limited.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l 1) (1976). Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20
(E.D. La. 1952), afd 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
89. A "call" is an option to purchase stock on or before a certain date at a fixed price; a
"put" is an option to sell stock on or before a certain date at a fixed price; "spreads" and
"straddles" involve combinations of "puts" and "calls," thus giving the holder the choice of
buying or selling on or before a certain date at a fixed price. SEC, Division of Trading and
Exchanges, Report of Pu and Call Options 7 (1961). For purposes of this article, "options" will be
used as the equivalent of calls granted by the issuer.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1 1) (1976).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3aI 1-1 (1978).
92. Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967); Heli-Coil Corp.
v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. at 834.
93. Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 223 F. Supp. 790, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'don othergrounds, 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
94. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934) noted: "The granting of options to pools and syndicates has been found to be at the bottom of most manipulative operations, because the granting of these options permits large-scale manipulations to be conducted
with a minimum of financial risk to the manipulators."
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1978).
97. Id. In UnitedStater o. Gutena, 281 F.2d 742, 748-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871
(1960), the court sustained this rule and relied on it in holding that the term "class" did not
include unissued shares reserved for the exercise of options or conversion rights.
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deposited. 98 When more than one series of security is issued, each having the
same privileges, they will likely be found to be different series of the same
class. 99 Further, the Second Circuit has held that convertible debentures
were not themselves "a class of any equity security," but were equity securities only in the sense that the class consists of the common stock outstanding,
augmented by the number of shares into which the debentures are convertible. 100
3.

Beneficial Ownership

As has been previously indicated, both initial reports and reports of any
changes in beneficial ownership must be filed pursuant to section 16(a). 0 1
Record ownership is, in itself, of no consequence since the legislative history
indicates that section 16 was intended to encompass more than mere legal
ownership.' 0 2 A record owner, or any other person fearing that he might be
deemed a beneficial owner, may file reports under section 16(a) but disavow
10 3
any implication that the filing is an admission of beneficial ownership.
The term "beneficial ownership" comes into question for section 16 purposes
when persons with a legal relationship to the insider, e.g., family members or
partners, realize short-term profits in the insider's corporation. Whether the
insider is the beneficial owner of securities held in the record name of a family member depends on whether the insider obtains benefits substantially
equivalent to ownership or if he can vest or revest title in himself at once, or
at some future time. 10° A partnership which is a ten percent beneficial owner for its own account must report regardless of whether reports are filed by
the individual partners. An individual partner must also report if his indirect interest in the issuer through the partnership, combined with the securities of which he is otherwise directly or indirectly the beneficial owner,
amounts to ten percent, or if he is the ten percent beneficial owner of some
other class of registered equity securities of the same issuer. 105 Similar rules
apply to holding companies and their controlling persons' 0 6 and trusts and
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1978).
99. Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1959), afg 167
F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
100. Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976). See notes 27-35 supra and accompanying text.
102. Hearngs on Stock Exchange Practices Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Curreng, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6556 (Testimony of Thomas Corcoran).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(d) (1978). Form 4, Instr. 18. A person reporting otherwise than
as the direct beneficial owner must specify the nature of his ownership. Id § 240.16a-3 (1978);
Form 3, Instr. 9; Form 4, Instr. 10.
104. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 7793 (1966). See also B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d
Cir. 1964); Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 523 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1975).
105. Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 1965 (1938). In Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403
(1962), the Supreme Court held that where a defendant brokerage firm realized a shortswing
profit while one of its partners was a director of the corporation whose stock had been
purchased and sold, only the director-partner was required to pay his pro rata share of the
firm's profit and that the partnership need not disgorge the remaining profits.
106. Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ex. Act. Rel. 1965 (1938). Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v.
Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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their trustees. 107
4.

Insiders
a.

Oflicer

The aim of section 16 was to destroy "the vicious practices unearthed at
the hearings" involving "the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by
officers and directors."' 10 8 In rule 3b-2,10 9 the Commission interpreted the
term "officer" to mean "a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary,
comptroller, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by
the foregoing officers." ' 10 In each case, the court must make "a careful examination of the nature of the particular applicant's activities, powers and
responsibilities." ' 1" Titles alone are not dispositive and do no more than
raise an inference that the person who holds the title has the executive duties
and opportunities for confidential information that the title implies. The
inference can be overcome by proof that the title is merely honorary and
does not carry with it any of the executive responsibilities that might otherwise be assumed.'12
b.

Director

Section 3(a)(7)' 1 3 defines the term "director" to mean "any director of a
corporation or any person performing similar functions with respect to any
'14
Presumably,
organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated."
considerations similar to those used in interpreting the term "officer" apply
in interpreting "director" since the Commission's definition of "officer" is
modeled on the statutory definition of "director." Further, an officer or director, because of his relationship with another person, may "deputize" another person and render such other person also an officer or director for
purposes of section 16(b) liability.' 15 Deputization is a question of fact to be
settled case by case. 16 Relevant factors are whether the director controlled
or gave advice relative to the investment policy of the other entity; whether,
107. 17
Marquette
108. S.
109. 17
110.

C.F.R. § 240.16a-8(g) (1978). Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 1965 (1938).
Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. at 962.
REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1978).

Id.

111. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 651-52 & n.19 (1963). See also Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Colby v. Klune, 83 F. Supp. 159
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'don other grounds, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
112. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Account Executive was given title "Vice-President" to reward an outstanding sales record but
retained sales duties and assumed no significant executive duties). See also Schimmel v.
Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1976).
114. Id.
115. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. at 406-07; Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260,
265-66 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566
(2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J., concurring); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp.
at 967.
116. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. at 962.
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in serving as a director, he intended to act as a deputy; and whether the
director was ultimately responsible for the total operation of the corporation. 17 A formal deputization need not be made if the conduct of the parties indicates that a deputization was intended.' 18
c.

Ten Percent Owner

An officer or director may be liable for profits realized on shortswing
transactions even though he purchased or sold shares before assuming" 19 or
after leaving12 0 office as long as both the purchase and sale transactions occurred within the statutory six month period and either the purchase or sale
occurred while he held office. An officer or director will not, however, incur
section 16(b) liability by purchasing and selling stock during a six month
21
period when both transactions occur after his resignation or retirement.'
On the other hand, section 16(b)' 22 specifically provides that a ten percent
beneficial owner must be such at both the dates of purchase and sale for
liability to result.' 23 As previously noted, the total amount of the issue, including unregistered securities and treasury shares, is used as the basis for the
ten percent calculation. The important issue, then, is when the owner acquires ten percent status. The Supreme Court held in Foremost-McKesson, Inc.
o. ProVdent Securti'es Co.,124 that the ten percent status was not acquired at
the initial purchase making the defendant a ten percent holder. A change in
beneficial ownership is made when a stockholder makes a firm commitment
125
to take, or divest himself of, the beneficial ownership of securities.
5.

Purchase and Sale
a.

Generally

Since both a "purchase" and a "sale" are specific statutory requirements under section 16(b),' 26 liability often turns upon the definitions of
"purchase" and "sale." Section 3(a)(13)127 of the Exchange Act defines
"purchase" to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire,"
and section 3(a)(14) defines "sale" to include "any contract to sell or other117. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d at 260.
118.

Id See alsoColby v. Klune, 178 F.2d at 872.

119. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d at 847; Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).

120. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d at 260.
121. Lewis v. Varnes, 368 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. I
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).

122. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423
U.S. 232 (1976); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d at 845.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1978). See notes 81-100 supra and accompanying text.
124. 423 U.S. 232 (1976). See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus. Inc., 527
F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert.
dented, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
125. Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 116 (1935). Compare Champion Home Builders
Co. v. Jeffress, 490 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1974) with Booth v. Varian Assoc., 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13), (14) (1976).
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wise dispose of."'1 2 8 Determining whether a purchase and a sale have occurred within a six month period presents little difficulty when the
transactions consist of an exchange of cash for stock or stock for cash. ' 29 The
statutory definitions, however, do not furnish explicit direction with respect
to the treatment under section 16(b) of insiders' securities transactions in
complex business dealings involving "unorthodox" transactions, 130 in that
one or both ends of the transaction have exchanges involving securities but
are not clearly either purchases or sales. Federal courts have developed two
different approaches in attempting to apply the terms "purchase" and "sale"
13
to unorthodox transactions. t
b.

Per Se-Objecttwe Approach

As previously discussed, section 16(b) was intended to ease plaintiffs'
evidentiary burdens' 32 and to be strictly and mechanically enforced.1 33 The
Supreme Court has stated that "the only method Congress deemed effective
to curb the evils of insider trading was a flat rule taking the profits out of a
class of transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great,"' 34 therefore considerations of intent, lack of motive, or improper conduct are irrelevant in section 16(b) suits.1 35 The judicial method
that developed from this intent of section 16(b) became known as the "objective" or "per se" approach. This approach appears to be in accordance with
congressional perception of the section as a "crude rule of thumb."' 136 The
"objective" or "per se" test is geared toward the broadest possible construction of "purchase" and "sale" and results in an all-inclusive prohibition
under section 16(b). The test entails little or no inquiry into either the manner in which the transaction was completed or the reasons or motives behind
it. 137 Under this objective approach, courts focus solely on whether the de128. Id.
129. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d at 231.
130. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961) (e.g., options, conversions,
reclassifications, and mergers).
131. Discussions of the tests are found in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411
U.S. 582, 594 n.26 (1973), and Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233, 235-37 (10th Cir. 1976).
132. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before a Suhcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currenc, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934).
133. As stated by Thomas Corcoran, chief spokesman for the proponents of the Exchange
Act:
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the security within six months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the
existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of
thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director
intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short-swing.
,
Hearings on Stock Exchange PracticesBefore a Subcomm. ofthe Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) (testimony of Thomas Corcoran).
134. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972). See also Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. at 595.
135. Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d at 236.
136. See note 19 supra. This method was employed to emphasize that no inquiry into the
intent of an insider was necessary under § 16(b), and because some persons who did not trade
on inside information would nevertheless be forced to disgorge their shortswing profits. Gratz v.

Claughton, 187 F.2d at 49.
137. See, e.g., Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. at 361.
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fendant owned the security before and after the transaction. If the security
was owned after but not before, or vice versa, the transaction was deemed a
section 16(b) "purchase" or "sale" under the objective test. 138 In one instance, it was stated that section 16(b) established an irrebuttable presumption that an insider who purchased and sold securities of his company within
six months was trading on inside information, since he would not otherwise
be motivated to exchange his stock so quickly, considering his large stake
and position in the corporation. 139 The objective approach began to be criticized, particularly in the case of certain unorthodox transactions, in which
its utilization could create "manifestly absurd and unfair"' 40 results leading
to "purposeless harshness."14'

c.

Pragmalic-Subjeclive Approach

Due to the uncertainty of whether "unorthodox" transactions, described
as "stock conversions, exchanges pursuant to mergers and other corporate
reorganizations, stock reclassifications and dealings in options, rights and
warrants,"' 42 should be classified as section 16(b) purchases or sales, courts
have developed a more subjective or pragmatic approach.14 3 This subjective
approach focuses on whether a transaction is of the type the statute was
designed to prevent. 14 4 Essentially, this means that the test limits the applicability of the "purchase" and "sale" provision of section 16(b) to those
transactions in which a possibility of speculative abuse exists, based on an
examination of the facts of each case. The subjective approach was first applied to a section 16(b) situation in Ferraiolov. Newman,' 4 5 where the court set
forth the following test: "Every transaction which can reasonably be defined
as a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can
1 46
possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by Section 16(b)."'
The court concluded that the transaction at issue in Ferraiolo was not a
purchase because the "conversion of . . . preferred to . . .common had
none of the economic indicia of a purchase," and "[t]he transaction was not
one that could have lent itself to the practices which Section 16(b) was en138. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d at 987.
139. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d at 303-04 (Hincks, J., dissenting). It
must be noted that, although the objective test was the original one used, it has been utilized in
full effect in only a few cases. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d at 156; Park & Tilford,
Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d at 984; Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. at 361. For example, in Park
& Tilford, the defendant insiders converted their preferred stock pursuant to a call for redemption by the company. The main issue in the case was whether the conversion was a "purchase"
of common stock. The court, in a manner characteristic of the objective test, answered in the
affirmative, stating: the "[diefendants did not own the common stock in question before they
exercised their option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock, within
the meaning of the Act." 160 F.2d at 987.
140. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 535 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
141. Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304,307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
142. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. at 593 n.24.
143. See, e.g., Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Feder
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969),
ceri. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
144. Segenerally S.REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934); S.REP. No.792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934).
145. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. dented, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
146. Id at 345.
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Conversion cases subsequent to Ferraiolo have adopted

148

Courts have applied this subjective approach to several cases involving
unorthodox transactions. 14 9 For example, in Newmark V. RKO General,
Inc.,150 the subjective test was used to determine that an exchange of stock
pursuant to a merger was a "sale" within the meaning of section 16(b). In
Newmark, RKO General had entered into an agreement to purchase the
shares of certain major shareholders of Central Airlines at a fixed price upon
the condition that Central merge with Frontier Airlines. The court found a
possibility of speculative abuse, both because RKO had obtained its option
to purchase Central stock before the news of the merger was made public
and because it had control over the terms and date of the merger.
Courts have also used the subjective approach to determine whether an
option agreement constitutes a purchase or sale, and thus have considered
the possible abuse of inside information in situations where an option could
be used as an instrument to manipulate the sale or purchase price of the
underlying security. ' For example, Booth v. Vanan Associates' 52 involved an
agreement entered into in 1959 in connection with a reorganization to issue
"contingent shares" based upon a guarantee of the market price of the stock
of the acquiring corporation in 1962. While conceding that the rights and
obligations of the parties with respect to the exchange of the stock became
fixed in 1959, the court held that the date of purchase of the contingent
shares for the purposes of section 16(b) was the date of their delivery in 1962
because the price at which the stock was to be purchased was to be determined by the market price at the time of delivery. The court intimated that
this date was selected because the possibility of speculative abuse existed in
the transaction
With the continued utilization of the subjective approach, courts have
made section 16(b) analysis inconsistent with the statute which was intended
to protect the marketplace from the evils of inside trading by means of a
"crude rule of thumb." Congress realized in enacting section 16(b) that the
result might be harsh in a given case. In the hearings prior to the enactment
of section 16(b), the spokesman for the administration made it clear: "You
have to have a general rule. In particular transactions it might work a hardship, but those transactions that are a hardship represent the sacrifice to the
necessity of having a general rule."' 1 53 Section 16(b) was intended to serve
147. Id at 346.
148. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d at 507; Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d at 528.
149. See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 418; Newmark v. RKO
General, Inc., 425 F.2d at 348; Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d at 304; American Standard,
Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
150. 425 F.2d at 348.
151. See, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970); Booth v. Varian Assoc.,
334 F.2d at 1; Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
152. 334 F.2d at 1.
153. Hearings on Stock Exchange ractces Before a Subcomm. of the Sen Comm. on Banking and Cur-

rency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) (Testimony of Thomas Corcoran). The Courts
decided that such a prohibition did not rise to constitutional dimensions. See, e.g., Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d at 49; Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d at 239-40.
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the public as a whole and the plaintiff-corporation was merely the tool that
Congress chose to enforce its will.'

54

By utliizing the subjective approach

and its "possibility for abuse" criteria, courts have interjected factors such as
control and equitable considerations into actions arising under section
16(b),1 55 have eliminated simplicity and predictability, and have severely
departed from the intent of the statute.
6.

Six Month Holding Period

In order for liability to attach under section 16(b), the exchange must
occur during "any period of less than six months.' 56 As Judge Dimock
stated in Stella o. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 157 the statutory period of "less
than six months" means "six months minus one full period from midnight to
midnight since the law does not take into account fractions of a day."' 58
The phrase "for a period exceeding six months" later in section 16(b) was
regarded "as a mere referential inaccuracy which cannot prevail over the
language used by Congress in creating the cause of action. '"'5 9
G.

Computation of Recoverable Profits

Profits recoverable under section 16(b) are computed by application of
the lowest-in-highest-out method, where purchases are arbitrarily matched
with sales to maximize the determination of profits. The same certificates
need not be subject to the purchase and sale. Under this rule of computation, a large recovery may result when the sequence of transactions actually
produced an overall loss to the shareholder. i6o
For purposes of illustration, assume a statutory insider made the following transactions in the same year:
January 1:
February 1:
March 1:
April 1:
May 1:
June 1:

Purchase of
Sale of
Purchase of
Sale of
Purchase of
Sale of

200 shares
100 shares
200 shares
200 shares
100 shares
100 shares

@
@
@
@
@
@

$50
$10
$30
$60
$20
$40

Under the lowest-in-highest-out method, the 100 shares purchased May 1 for
$20 per share would be matched with 100 of the shares sold April 1 for $60
154. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (E.D. La. 1952).
155. It had been held that equitable factors, raised as defenses, are not appropriate in
§ 16(b) actions. For instance, in Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. at 655-56, the fact that a defendant may actually have intended to benefit the corporation was held to be an insufficient basis to
estop the corporation from recovering his shortswing profits. In Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
Giroux, 312 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court held that, irrespective of the resulting
benefit to the corporation, estoppel-based defenses to the actions asserted under § 16(b) are
insufficient as a matter of law.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
157. 132 F. Supp. at 100.
158. Id at 104.

159. Id See also Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d at 475 n.3.
160. See, e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d at 50-52.
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per share to produce a recoverable profit on those 100 shares of $40 per share
or $4000. The 200 shares purchased March 1 for $30 per share would be
matched with the remaining 100 shares sold April 1 for $60 per share, thus
producing a recoverable profit of $30 per share or $3000, and with the 100
shares sold June 1 for $40 per share, producing a recoverable profit of $40
per share or $1000. The 100 shares purchased January 1 for $50 per share
could not be used to produce a recoverable profit since the only remaining
sale, that made on February 1, was at $10 per share, a price per share lower
than the purchase price of $50 per share. Thus, the issuer can obtain recoverable profits of $8000 when the insider actually had an overall loss of $1000.
II.

APPLICATION OF SECTION 16(b) TO INSIDER TRADING INVOLVING
ISSUER-GRANTED STOCK EMPLOYEE OPTIONS

A.

Generally

Perhaps the most objectionable of the evils Congress intended to prohibit by section 16 are evidenced in insider trading relating to stock options. ' 6 1 When insider trading concerns stock options, the opportunities for
speculative abuse are enhanced by the relatively insubstantial financial investment required. In the situation of employer-granted employee stock options, no investment is usually required for the employee to hold the option.
In the case of market trading in stock options, the market value of the option
is usually the difference between market price of the underlying stock and
the exercise price to purchase such stock pursuant to the option, discounted
by a time factor if such options are not immediately exercisable. In either
situation, the insider may greatly increase his likelihood of gain because of
the additional leverage generated. Thus, for modest or no financial commitment by the insider, he may gain a vantage point to use inside information
to his own benefit.' 62 This advantage is, of course, of greater benefit if the
option is immediately exercisable.
There are legitimate corporate purposes for which an employer-issuer
might deem it advisable, or even necessary, to grant options to purchase
stock. For example, the granting of stock options to executives may often be
a less expensive way of providing incentive than increasing salaries. Stock
options have a speculative appeal, in that the uncertain and contingent rewards offered are of potentially greater value to the employee. These factors,
combined with the right to obtain more options for relatively low cost, offer
an incentive to employees.163
However advantageous the granting of stock options might be to all
concerned, if the stock subject to the options is listed on a national securities
exchange, or if any other equity security of the company is so listed, then
each of the transactions involving the use of options must be examined in the
161. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934). See also notes 13-15, 94 supra
and accompanying text.
162. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
163. For a more complete discussion of employee stock options generally, see Dean, Employee
Stock Options, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1953). See also Lang & Katz, Section 16(b) and Extraordinag Transactions: CorporateReorganizations and Stock Options, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 705 (1974).
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light of section 16(b).'

64

As we have previously noted, many options are exempted from the coverage of section 16(b) by rule 16b-3,165 but the stock acquired upon the exercise of qualified options is not exempted by the rule. Despite the relative
ease with which the exemption of the rule can be obtained, many issuers still
fail to meet the requirements. The remainder of this article will deal with
those situations in which the exemption of rule 16b-3 does not attach because of failure to comply with its requirements and those situations in
which stock has been acquired upon the exercise of options qualified under
the rule.
B.

Unexercised Options

As previously noted, unexercised, employer-granted stock options will
not typically result in section 16(b) liability, since to qualify for favorable tax
treatment stock options granted must be made nontransferable except by
will or the laws of descent.' 66 Thus, a stock option granted to an insider
pursuant to such a plan will not be matched with a subsequent sale of that
option itself for purposes of section 16(b) liability. On the other hand, when
transferable options acquired pursuant to unqualified stock option plans or
transferable options otherwise acquired are sold, section 16(b) liability may
result in the amount of the difference between the sale proceeds and the
67
value of the options on the date of acquisition.'
For purposes of analysis, there is no practical difference between trading
in unexercised, negotiable employee stock options and the market trading of
unexercised put and call options. As a method of insider speculation, neither
is different from the purchase and sale of stock itself.'6' Further, if the contentions of this article are accepted, we can envision no situation in which
insider trading in unexercised options would not be subject to section 16(b)
liability unless such unexercised options are sold more than six months prior
to the date on which they become exercisable.

C.

Exercised Options

At least in the case of immediately exercisable stock option plans, the
date of grant may be important for purposes of valuation and determining
the holding period under section 16(b). Of course, many employee stock
option plans are not immediately exercisable. If such options are immediately exercisable, the exercise and subsequent sale of stock thereunder within
six months would certainly result in section 16(b) liability if a profit was
realized. However, for most purposes, the date of grant has been rejected as
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1978). See notes 56-75 supra and accompanying text.
166. I.R.C. §§ 421-424. See also note 62 supra and accompanying text.
167. Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.), afdpercunm sub noma.Truncale v.
Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950).
168. For a more complete discussion of the application of Section 16(b) to market trading in
stock options, see Note, Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 69 YALE

LJ. 868 (1960).
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an important date for analysis in determining section 16(b) liability when
stock has subsequently been sold.
As we have previously discussed, for section 16(b) liability to result,
both a "purchase" and a "sale" of the security must be found within the
short swing period. 169 "Purchase" is defined in section 3(a)(13),

70

to include

71

any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.'
In Park & Ti'ford v.
Schulte,, 7 2 the Second Circuit, in deciding that the exercise of a right to convert preferred shares into common shares was a "purchase," held that this
definition was broad enough to include any acquisition as well as an executory contract to acquire. That the date of exercise may be a purchase date
has been assumed at least since Shaw v. Dryfiss.' 73 This was reaffirmed in
Blau v. Hodgkinson,174 where the court held that the exercise of an option
acquired pursuant to employment constituted a purchase and computed the
holding period from the date of exercise. In Truncale v. Blumberg, 175 an action
was brought against several insiders of Universal Pictures Company, who
had been granted immediately exercisable stock warrants pursuant to their
employment contracts. The court held that the receipt of such a warrant
was "an 'acquisition' in the same sense as was the receipt of the common
17 6
stock upon the conversion of the preferred in Park & Tifiord v. Schulte."'
However, in determining the damages recoverable to the issuer, the court
determined that the cost basis of the defendants in the warrant included past
services rendered and their promises to work in the future. The market
value of the warrants on the date of their acquisition was determined to be a
measure of their value on the theory that the grant of the warrants was like a
payment by the corporation of the amount of cash necessary to purchase
such warrants on that day. Since the sale price was less than the market
price of the warrants on their date of issue, no profits were realized and no
77
damages were recoverable.'
Under that reasoning, the date of purchase in such an option transaction would not be the date of grant if the option was acquired prior to the
accrual of the right to exercise it. In Steinberg v. Sharpe,178 options were issued
which were not immediately exercisable. The court held that the "date of
acquisition" for determining section 16(b) liability and valuation was the
accrual date (the date on which such options became exercisable), since
nothing of measurable value had passed to the optionee until such time as
the option became exercisable.' 79 In Stenberg, the insider held options that
had accrued at yearly intervals commencing one year after their grant for
several years prior to their exercise. The court, reasoning that the insider
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); see a/so notes 126-28 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1976).
Id.
160 F.2d at 984.
172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949).
100 F. Supp. at 361.
80 F. Supp. at 387.
Id at 392.
Id
95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), affdper curiar, 190 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1951).
95 F. Supp. at 34.
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should retain the benefit of long-term gain attributable to holding the options for more than six months, applied the Truncale formula' 80 that compensation by way of the options was equal to the difference between the
exercise price of the options and the market value of the underlying stock on
the date of accrual of the options. Thus, the amount recoverable was held to
be the difference between the market value of the stock on the date of accrual of the options and the price received on the date of sale of the stock.
In an effort to mitigate the harsh result of possible forfeiture of longterm gain in connection with the use of options as required by Steirnberg, the
Commission adopted rule 16b-6,1 81 limiting the amount recoverable on the
short swing sale of optioned stock to the difference between the proceeds of
sale and the lowest market price of any security of the same class within six
months before or after the date of sale. Thus, the long-term aspects of the
insider profits in such transactions are exempted by the rule. This rule, however, may not be used to enlarge the amount of profit which would otherwise
inure to the issuer in its absence. Hence, the rule was not applied in determining the purchase price of stock where the effect of the application would
82
have been to increase the amount of recoverable profit.'
D.

Unexercised Options

It is not difficult to find recoverable short swing profits when the insider
has exercised options and sold stock within six months of the accrual date of
the options since all critical dates are within the shortswing period. Conversely, a more difficult analysis must be made if section 16(b) profits are to
be recovered when stock is sold within six months of the accrual date but
options were never exercised by the insider, or at least not within six months
of the stock sale. For profits to be recoverable to the issuer in this framework,
a "purchase" must be found in the mere accrual of the options. This possibility is suggested in the Steinberg v. Sharpe 83 determination that the date of
acquisition of stock was not the date of exercise but the date of accrual. In
Steinberg both the date of exercise and the date of accrual fell within six
months of the date of sale and it was not necessary for the court there to
determine whether the accrual date used for measuring the cost basis could
also be a "purchase" date for measuring the six month holding period.
We submit that the possibility of evil Congress intended to prevent in
promulgating section 16(b), the abuse of inside information to the insider's
advantage, manifests itself most fully not with the exercise of an option when
a financial commitment has been made by the insider, but rather when the
option becomes exercisable. When the option is exercisable, the insider occupies a vantage point from which to make the most virulent abuses of inside
information with little or no investment on his part.
For example, assume that, on January 1, 1978, the issuer granted unqualified stock options to the president of the issuer, who already held 100
180. Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. at 677.
181. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1978). See also notes 76-80
182. B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d at 255.

183. 95 F. Supp. at 32.

supra and accompanying text.
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shares of the issuer's stock, and that these options became exercisable on
January 1, 1979. If, on March 1, 1979, the president sold the 100 shares he
had held before the grant of the option, the issuer would be able to recover
the difference between the sale price of such stock and the value of such stock
on the date of accrual. This analysis is proper under the intent of section
16(b).' 84 The apparent harshness of this result is, of course, mitigated since
the long-term aspects of gain are protected by rule 16b-6.1 85
Further, it is our view that, if a further extension of the Steinberg analysis
is made, section 16(b) short swing profits may be recoverable by the issuer in
a situation in which an insider sells stock more than six months from the
accrual date while options are still exercisable, even if no options are exercised within the six month period, or at all. Although the position of advantage gained by an option holder does not begin on the date an option is
exercised, but rather with its exercisability, this position is not isolated in the
single day on which the option first becomes exercisable, the accrual date,
but continues throughout the period of exercisability. Thus, to extend Steinberg, any date of exercisability should constitute a purchase date for calculating the six month holding requirement of section 16(b).
For example, again assume that the issuer granted its president stock
options on January 1, 1978, that the president already held 100 shares of the
issuer's stock, that the options were exercisable on January 1, 1979, and that
such options were exercisable through December 31, 1983. Under this analysis, if the president were to sell his 100 shares of stock on January 1, 1980,
the issuer would be able to recover the difference between the sale price and
the lowest value of the stock on any date between July 2, 1979, and June 30,
1980. 186
It is our contention that the date on which an option becomes exercisable is a valid "purchase" date for determining the six month holding period
of section 16(b) since on that date the insider gains a position of advantage
in the securities of the issuer from which speculative abuse is likely; and further, that on any date of exercisability of such an option, not merely the first
date, the insider holds this position. Essentially, this means that an insider
would be unable to sell stock or options of the issuer at any time within six
months of any date on which he held exercisable stock options if the value of
such stock or options on any such date was lower than the sale price without
incurring liability under section 16(b). This analysis is perfectly consistent
with the mandate of section 16(b).
E.

Examples

To illustrate the foregoing, a tabular presentation of several possible
transactions involving insider trading in employer-granted stock options and
184. See notes 1-26 supra and accompanying text.
185. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1978). See aLso notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
186. As we have previously noted, the statutory holding period is actually six months minus

one day. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded
on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).

supra and accompanying text.

See also notes 157-59
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an analysis of the probable section 16(b) consequences of such transactions
follow. We will assume that all options are exercisable for a period of five
years following accrual. We will also assume that all transactions were by
statutory insiders and that the other section 16(b) requirements were satisfied.
1.

Example (1)

There is little doubt that this transaction would be subject to section
16(b) liability since all critical events occurred within the six month period.
This transaction does not differ practically from the situation of market dealing in options by insiders. 187
2.

Example (2)

Again, there seems to be little doubt that this transaction would be subject to section 16(b) liability. This transaction differs from Example (1) in
that, although the date of sale and the date of accrual occurred within the
statutory period, the date of sale occurred more than six months after the
date of grant. As we have previously noted, the date of grant is not of particular significance in section 16(b) analysis. This transaction does not differ
practically from the situation of market dealing in options by insiders.
3.

Example (3)

This situation is similar to Example (2) except that both the accrual
date and sale date are more than six months from the grant date. As we
have noted, however, the date of grant is relatively unimportant and, since
the two critical dates, the date of accrual and date of sale, are within the
statutory period, section 16(b) liability would attach. Again, there is no
practical difference between this situation and the situation of market dealing in options by insiders.
4.

Example (4)

This illustration is intended to emphasize that section 16(b) prohibits
either a purchase and subsequent sale or sale and subsequent purchase
within one statutory period.' 88 Here, since the critical accrual and sale dates
187. For a general discussion of market trading in options by insiders, see Note Put and Call
Opizons Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 69 YALE L.J. 868 (1960).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976) provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by himfiom any purchase and sale, or any sale andpurchase, of
any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner . . . . (emphasis
supplied).
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fall within the six month statutory period, section 16(b) liability will result.
This, again, resembles insider market trading in options.
5.

Example (5)

We believe this to be the only example situation involving unexercised
options in which the insider would not be liable for recoverable profits under
section 16(b). Here, since the date of sale, January 1, 1980, is more than six
months before the date of accrual, January 1, 1981, no purchase date within
the statutory period exists which can be matched with that sale date to produce section 16(b) recovery.
6.

Example (6)

This situation involves a more difficult analysis than in those situations
preceding. For section 16(b) liability to result in this situation, our contention that any date on which the insider holds exercisable options may be a
"purchase" date for purposes of section 16(b) analysis must be accepted.' 8 9
Thus, assuming that this contention is valid, when the insider sells options on
January 1, 1981, since options are exercisable within six months of the date
of such sale, section 16(b) liability will ensue. We conclude that in any situation in which insiders trade in unexercised options, section 16(b) liability will
result unless they are sold more than six months prior to the date of accrual,
because the options must be exercisable presently or must become exercisable in the future to have market value. For unexercised options to be removed from section 16(b) vulnerability, they must be sold more than six
months either before or after their term of exercisability. They, of course,
will not be sold after their exercisability, since, once expired, they have no
value.
7.

Example (7)

This situation is identical to (1) except that the March 1, 1979, sale is of
stock rather than options. We see no practical difference in this situation
and would expect that section 16(b) recovery would result as in (1). This
situation resembles a section 16(c) prohibition.19°
8.

Example (8)

We think there is little doubt that this situation would result in section
16(b) liability. All critical events fall within the statutory six month period.
9.

Example (9)

This situation illustrates, once again, that the date of grant has little
importance in section 16(b) analysis.
189. See text accompanying and following note 186 supra.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1976) makes it unlawful for an officer, director, or ten percent
shareholder to sell an equity security, directly or indirectly, if he does not own the security sold
(short sales and sales against the box).
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Example (10)

This example illustrates that the date of exercise may be a "purchase"
date for section 16(b) analysis. 191
11.

Example (11)

This example is intended to illustrate that the six month statutory period is actually "six months minus one full period from midnight to midnight."1 9 2 Thus, assuming that the insider here sold all the stock he held on
June 30, 1980, and that all options were exercised on January 1, 1980, no
section 16(b) liability would result.
12.

Example (12)

This example illustrates again that section 16(b) liability extends to
193
sales and subsequent purchases as well as purchases and subsequent sales.
13.

Example (13)

This example requires more difficult analysis than the preceding situations dealing with exercised options. For this example, we are assuming that
on January 1, 1981, the insider exercised half of his options, and that on
January 1, 1982, an equivalent number of shares of stock were sold. To
produce section 16(b) liability in this situation, our contention that any date
on which the insider holds exercisable options may be a "purchase" date for
purposes of section 16(b) analysis must be accepted.' 94 Thus, assuming that
this contention is valid, since the other half of the insider's options remained
exercisable at the date of sale, section 16(b) liability results.
14.

Example (14)

It seems certain that this situation is one that will not be subject to
section 16(b) liability, even under our contentions. Although half of the insider's options here remained unexercised but exercisable for the five year
period following the accrual date, January 1, 1980, if the sales on January 1,
1987, were the only sales by this insider and such insider held no other exercisable options and had made no purchases of stock within six months of the
sale, no section 16(b) liability would result since more than six months would
elapse between the expiration of the exercisability of such options and the
sale of stock.
15.

Example (15)

This example assumes that all options were exercised on January 1,
1981, and that the insider held no other exercisable options within six
months of the sale on January 1, 1982. It appears equally clear that this
191. See notes 183-86 supra and accompanying text.
192. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. at 104. See also notes 157-59 supra
and accompanying text.
193.

See also note 188 supra.

194. See text accompanying and following note 186 supra.
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situation will not result in section 16(b) liability to the insider. Since all
exercisable options were exercised on January 1, 1981, no "purchase" dates
remain available to match against the January 1, 1982 sale.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

As previously noted,' 9 5 the prime objective of the Exchange Act is the
establishment and maintenance of a free and open market for the trading of
securities in which all traders have full knowledge of all facts and circumstances. Section 16(b) recognizes that officers, directors, and ten percent
shareholders, by reason of their relationship to the issuer, have access to information not available to the market generally and, by reason of their managerial control, have the ability to pervert corporate activities for the sole
purpose of influencing the price of securities of the issuer.
Section 16(b) is a remedial statute, designed to prevent a corporate insider from profiting through speculation in the stock of a publicly traded
corporation with which he is connected by unfairly using information available to him as an insider. 9 6 Section 16(b) was devised to deprive the officer,
director, or ten percent shareholder of any incentive to trade actively in any
securities of his issuer, by removing the profit from all such transactions involving a purchase and sale of such securities within any period of less than
six months, irrespective of the intention of such person in entering into such
purchase or sale. Although trading in such securities is not forbidden, the
profits resulting therefrom are recoverable by the issuer.
Section 16(b) is a blanket provision predicated on the thesis that statutory insiders, whether they have abused their positions or not, should be deprived of the opportunity to do so to the detriment of the market. Section
16(b) restricts officers and directors to their duties as such and restricts substantial stockholders to being such for the purposes of investment and control. The provision prohibits such insiders from speculating in shares of the
issuer. The result is that the prohibitions of section 16(b) fall equally upon
the most exemplary of the insiders as well as upon those who would abuse
their trust.
To make administration of the statutory scheme simple, Congress
adopted a prophylactic measure which permits recovery by the corporation
of the profits from a class of insider transactions in which "the possibility of
abuse was believed to be intolerably great,"' 9 7 i.e., purchases and sales by an
insider within six months, "without proof of actual abuse of insider information, and without proof of intent to profit on the basis of such information."' 98
Section 16(b) was enacted to remedy a recognized abuse of insider information and it should be liberally construed.' 99 The Supreme Court has
195.

See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.

196. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 418; Blau v. Max Factor & Co.,
342 F.2d at 304; Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d at 840.
197. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 422.
198. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. at 595.
199. Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233.
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stated that "where alternative constructions of the terms of section 16(b) are
possible, those terms are to be given the construction that best serves the
congressional purpose of curbing short swing speculation by corporate insid20
ers." 20 0 This holding was reaffirmed in Kern County. 1
The definitions of these terms is a matter of federal law. 20 2 "The phrase
'any purchase and sale' in section 16(b) is therefore not to be limited or
defined solely in terms of commercial law of sales and notions of contractual
rights and duties." 20 3 The transactions must focus on and be consistent with
the congressional mandate of curbing insider short-swing speculation. "The
question thus becomes one of balancing the respective advantages and disadvantages of each contended for 'purchase' date and determining which one,
if held to be the date of purchase, would be more likely to lend itself to the
20 4
abuses the statute was designed to protect against."
It is our view that recent decisions of federal courts, favoring the use of
the "subjective" or "pragmatic" approach 20 5 have departed from these basic
objectives of section 16(b).
The section 16(b) remedy, unlike the remedy afforded by rule lOb-5, is
not a fraud remedy and the elements required to establish fraud are irrelevant to section 16(b). The factors courts have considered in applying the
"subjective" or "pragmatic" approach have essentially injected fraud analysis into section 16(b). Congress established a unique remedy in section 16(b),
absolute in its prohibition and independent of any fraudulent intent on the
part of the insider. If this remedy is to be altered or eliminated, it is the
province of Congress to do so.

200. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 424.
201. 411 U.S. at 595.
202. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337-38 (1967); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S.
at 413-14; Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d at 696.
203. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d at 697.
204. Booth v. Varian Assoc., 334 F.2d at 4.
205. See notes 142-55 supra and accompanying text.

